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Making Free Trade Fairi
I. Introduction
Philosophers have done very little work on what makes trade fair. Perhaps the most extensive 
discussion is Malgorzata Kurjanska and Mathias Risse’s paper, “Fairness in Trade II: Export Subsidies and 
the Fair Trade Movement.”ii In their paper, Kurjanska and Risse consider the case for trade subsidies and 
the Fair  Trade movement. They suggest  that it  is not permissible for developed countries to give their  
producers subsidies because doing so does not strike an appropriate balance between meeting the needs of  
the global poor while protecting domestic workers. iii Kurjanska and Risse also argue that the case for Fair 
Trade hinges, primarily, on whether or not it is part of the best development strategy for poor countries.  
They do not think Fair Trade is part of the best development strategy and, so, they believe purchasing Fair  
Trade certified goods is only acceptable because doing so does not constitute a large share of the market in  
traded goods. This paper argues that the case against subsidies and Fair Trade Kurjanska and Risse present  
is much weaker than they make out. To the contrary, it argues that giving some subsidies and purchasing 
some Fair Trade certified goods may even be necessary to make trade fair. Section II starts by saying a few 
words about the normative framework Kurjanska and Risse adopt. Section III  reviews their arguments.  
Section IV tries to show that Kurjansk and Risse have not provided the requisite evidence to make their 
case for free trade. Section V suggests that giving some subsidies and purchasing some Fair Trade certified 
goods may be morally required. Section VI concludes.
II. Fairness
Kurjanska and Risse want to know what makes trade fair. So, they consider the nature of fairness.  
On Kurjanska and Risse’s account, fairness is a matter of distributive and/or procedural justice. There are  
many ways to assess distributions and procedures. Some distributions or procedures give everyone equal 
opportunity, maximize the amount of resources people posses, or minimize the amount harm or disutility in 
a  situation.  Fairness,  however,  is  more  specific  than  distributive  or  procedural  justice.  A concern  for 
fairness is a concern for what people are due. Charity, Kurjanska and Risse specify, cannot be fair or unfair 
because  no one is  owed charity.  Furthermore,  they go  on,  fairness  aims at  appropriate  satisfaction of 
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individuals’ claims; we must know how to fulfill different individuals’ claims appropriately to know what  
fairness requires.
There  are  many  theories  about  what  people  are  due  and  how  to  satisfy  competing  claims 
appropriately.iv Utilitarians, for instance, believe that people have an equal claim to the satisfaction of their  
interests or the promotion of their welfare. Utilitarians believe appropriately satisfying interests requires 
maximizing  collective  (aggregated)  well  being.  For  utilitarians,  “fairness  talk  supervenes  on  talk  of 
aggregate utility.”v Deontologists (and other kinds of consequentialists) have more complicated theories. 
Often deontologists (and non-utilitarian consequentialists) provide complicated metrics for appropriately 
comparing individuals’ competing claims.vi 
Kurjanska and Risse accept a deontological theory on which people have claims to the satisfaction 
of their needs, to what they are entitled, and to what they deserve. They suggest that, once we have a way 
of comparing desert-, need-, and entitlement-based claims, we should “satisfy claims within each category 
proportionately.”vii They do not give a general analysis of how to do this, however. Kurjanska and Risse 
only say that  “one way of  thinking of  proportionality is  to hand the object  [that  satisfies  individuals’  
claims] to individuals for time periods proportionate to the strength of their claim[s].”viii They indicate later 
that  they assume a (statist)  Rawlsian liberal  egalitarian framework on which countries are obligated to 
ensure  that  their  citizens  all  have  equal  opportunities  and  inequalities  in  the  distribution  of  resources 
redound to the advantage of the least well off. They also imply that developed countries have some duties 
to the global poor that are quite demanding but do not provide a general way of balancing the claims of the 
global  poor  against  the  claims  of  developed  countries’  citizens.  Let  us  assume  here,  however,  that 
Kurjanska and Risse’s claims about fairness are correct, insofar as they go, and turn to their arguments  
against subsidies and Fair Trade.ix
III. Outline of Kurjanska and Risse’s Argument
Subsidies
Kurjanska  and  Risse  consider  two  arguments  for  subsidies:  individual-claims-based  and 
collective-preference-based  arguments.  On the  individual-claims-based  argument,  producers  may claim 
compensatory subsidies when they are harmed by free trade. They may claim protection from competition 
to maintain their chosen line of work. Suppose that, with free trade, French farmers cannot compete with 
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Thai farmers. On the individual-claims-based argument, French farmers can argue that their interests are 
being sacrificed for the aggregate and demand compensation for their losses. 
Kurjanska and Risse think that the individual-claims-based argument fails because producers do 
not have a claim to subsidies within a Rawlsian liberal egalitarian framework. Rather, Kurjanska and Risse 
believe workers only have a claim to general economic support in times of need. They say that in very 
highly structured command-and-control economies the individual-claims based argument might go through. 
These highly structured states give their workers legitimate expectations of being able to continue in their  
particular line of work. In most countries, however, Kurjanska and Risse do not think workers can demand 
subsidies. 
On the collective-preference-based argument for subsidies, countries should get to express their 
preferences by subsidizing the production of whatever goods they value. The French might, for instance, 
prefer “baguette from French grain,  camembert  from French cows, and foie gras  from French ducks.”x 
Subsidizing French farmers may be necessary to preserve French culture or to minimize the environmental 
costs of long distance transport. If the French are willing to accept the dead-weight losses these subsidies  
bring, they might insist that the subsidies are acceptable.xi 
Kurjanska and Risse do not believe that the collective-preference-based argument for subsidies is 
any more successful than the individual-claims-based argument. They argue that the (moral) losses to non-
producers from subsidies may outweigh the gains to producers.  xii In particular, Kurjanska and Risse claim 
that  if free trade is essential  for growth and development,  “trade-liberalization becomes mandatory for  
developed countries.”xiii As long as poverty alleviation “bears more weight than cultural preservation… 
attempts at preservation ought not to be trade-distorting.”xiv If, for instance, the French want to support their 
farmers, they have to use non-trade distorting measures.xv Kurjanska and Risse think this is a good way of 
balancing (proportionately)  citizens’  claims against  the  claims of  the  needy.xvi Perhaps this  is  because 
distortions usually result in net losses and Kurjanska and Risse think 1) the gains we will see by using non-
distorting measures will generally accrue to the needy and 2) non-trade distorting measures will protect  
citizens’ most important interests, even if some workers have to switch industries. 
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Very likely, Kurjanska and Risse would also object to subsides not intended to 1) help the poor or 
2) meet other moral objectives. For, in the companion article to “Fairness in Trade II: Export Subsidies and 
the Fair Trade Movement,” Risse explicitly rejects protectionist subsidies that are ill intentioned. 
Kurjanska and Risse think their arguments support some of the current rules of trade embodied in  
the World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular, Kurjanska and Risse believe the WTO is right to reject 
export subsidies but accept other kinds of producer support.xvii Kurjanska and Risse recognize that some 
export subsidies may harm poor producers by increasing low-price competition for their products but they 
point out that this can have compensating advantages for the poor. The French may, for instance, subsidize  
technological research intended to benefit French farmers that benefit poor Thai farmers too.  
Kurjanska  and  Risse also  recognize  that  the growth  free  trade  brings  may benefit  some poor 
people more than others. If, for instance, agricultural trade is liberalized, many poor net food importing 
countries may do worse because they have to pay higher prices for food.xviii Hence, Kurjanska and Risse 
conclude, there is reason to redistribute the benefits  of free trade. Kurjanska and Risse think that such 
redistribution will be difficult because there are so many countries trading with each other and, so, do not  
suggest any practical way of doing so. 
Fair Trade
In  the second half  of  “Fairness  in Trade  II:  Export  Subsidies  and the Fair  Trade Movement” 
Kurjanska and Risse consider the case for purchasing Fair Trade certified products.  To qualify as Fair 
Trade  certified,  laborers  must  be  paid  prices  or  given  wages  “sufficient  to  make  a  living.” xix Often 
producers also receive financial and technical assistance, price support, and loans.xx “In respect to products 
largely grown by small farmers, price is the concern. If the product is grown on large estates, the focus falls  
on wages and working conditions.”xxi Finally,  Fair Trade goods may have to be made in good working 
conditions in an environmentally sustainable way.xxii
As with arguments for subsidies, Kurjanska and Risse object to both individual-claims-based and 
collective-preference-based arguments for Fair Trade. On the individual-claims-based arguments for Fair 
Trade producers have a claim to Fair Trade standards when they are harmed by free trade. Poor producers 
might argue, for instance,  that free trade makes it  difficult for them to secure a living wage or decent 
working conditions and request compensation. 
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Kurjanska and Risse argue, however, that consumers should be concerned about whether or not 
Fair Trade is the best development strategy for poor countries, not whether it helps poor producers. They 
are  not  as  clear  as  one  might  like  about  the  relationship  that  must  obtain  between  Fair  Trade  and  
development. It  is pretty clear, however, that they think Fair Trade purchases can generally be justified 
only if they are part of the best development strategy. They say “the challenge for Fair Trade advocates  
remains that theirs may not be the most promising development strategy.”xxiii Fair Trade may not work, for 
instance, in oppressive regimes; a better way to help poor people may be to work to end the oppression.  
Furthermore, Kurjanska and Risse think that Fair Trade may not be the best development strategy because 
it may induce poor people to specialize in ways that are not in their long term interests. To support this 
point, they offer the case of Costa Rica. Costa Rica successfully promoted development by moving away  
from producing goods associated with Fair Trade. They say that:
In Costa Rica a focus on new exports and eco-tourism allowed for diversification away 
from coffee and bananas. The export share of non-traditional products rose from 38.6% 
in 1982 to 87% in 2003. Consumers who would have supported Fair Trade with regard to 
coffee and bananas in Costa Rica would have resisted a shift that in the long run turned 
out  for  the  better.  (One  may even  argue  that  providing  opportunities  for  farmers  to 
transition out of farming improved the lot of those who entered a new more profitable 
and  less  volatile  sector.  Moreover,  by decreasing production  of  bananas,  it  increased 
returns for those who retained their business. It can be asserted that by providing aid and 
higher  than market  price  returns  to  those who can  obtain  its  label,  it  simultaneously 
provides incentives for others to continue in or even enter an unprofitable market with 
hopes to gain access to the limited Fair Trade market.)xxiv
Kurjanska and Risse believe Fair Trade may be acceptable under some conditions. It might, for instance, be 
help address injustices that primarily make producers worse off. Alternately, Fair Trade may be acceptable 
if there is nothing better we can do for a country – if, for instance, we cannot help a country’s workers 
transition into a better industry. But Kurjanska and Risse do not think Fair Trade can generally be justified.
On the collective-preference-based argument for Fair Trade, people should be free to make their 
own purchasing decisions and express their preferences for some goods over others. People should get to 
choose Fair Trade certified over regular goods because Fair Trade goods are different than regular goods.  
The  thought  is  that  Fair  Trade  goods  are  produced  in  a  different,  more  ethical,  way  than  otherwise  
equivalent regular goods; and, because the process of production is part of the product, Fair Trade goods 
are not the same as regular goods. On the collective-preference-based argument, consumers should be free 
to purchase Fair Trade goods that are not made under duress or in terrible working conditions. xxv
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Kurjanska and Risse are not convinced. They do not think Fair Trade bananas are really different 
from regular bananas because they have different moral characteristics.xxvi Furthermore, they think that, 
although  the  Fair  Trade  certified  banana-production  processes  may  be  fairer,  purchasing  Fair  Trade 
bananas may lead to a less fair world over time. Consumer choice is not more important than pursing the 
best development strategy for the poor. 
In short, Kurjanska and Risse do not think purchasing Fair Trade certified goods is part of the best 
development  strategy.  So,  they  conclude  that  it  is  only permissible to  buy Fair  Trade  certified  goods 
because there is no reason to think purchasing Fair Trade goods will have a real impact in any case; Fair 
Trade does not have a large enough market share to matter.xxvii
IV. Critique of Kurjanska and Risse’s Argument
This section takes issue with Kurjanska and Risse’s arguments against (most) subsidies and Fair  
Trade.  It  does  not  question  Kurjanska  and  Risse’s  claim  that  liberalization  promotes  growth  and 
development. Nor does it question Kurjanska and Risse’s claim that developed countries are obligated to 
give  priority  to  helping  poor  countries  develop.  Rather  this  section  questions  Kurjanska  and  Risse’s 
argument that free trade is not part of the best development strategy. When Kurjanska and Risse talk about 
subsidies, their argument rests on some undefended empirical claims about the growth and incentive effects  
of free trade vs. different kinds of subsidies. The data does not support their case -- even subsidies that are  
not backed by the best intentions may be part of the best development strategy. When Kurjanska and Risse  
talk about Fair Trade, they only provide theoretical reason to think that Fair Trade is not part of the best 
development strategy. Theoretical argument cannot make this case, empirical evidence is necessary; it is  
possible to give a theoretical argument for Fair Trade being part of the best development strategy as strong 
as the argument against this conclusion Kurjanska and Risse offer. So, since Kurjanska and Risse do not  
provide the requisite empirical evidence to show that (most) subsidies and Fair Trade are not part of the 
best development strategy; they have not made their case for free trade. 
Before  beginning,  however,  it  is  worth noting a general  problem with Kurjanska  and Risse’s 
arguments. A Rawlsian framework does not apply to policies (let alone consumer choice!) directly but to 
institutions.xxviii There are significant problems for trying to evaluate policies in isolation using a Rawlsian  
framework.xxix Even if a sate’s policy seems to maximize the position of that state’s least well off subjects, a 
6
different  policy  might  bring  greater  gains  to  these  subjects  if  background  policies  are  changed.  Even 
policies that seem to harm the least well off may be required because they, in combination with a different  
set of policies maximize the position of the least well off. The relevant analysis is probably too complicated 
to carry out. This provides one reason to think that it is hard, if not impossible, to figure out what the best  
development strategy is in general. Hopefully this will become clear below. But the following arguments 
should stand alone, even if this worry can be averted.xxx
Subsidies
Kurjanska  and  Risse  do  not  specify  exactly  what  they  intend  to  count  as  a  subsidy.  In  the 
economic literature many kinds of governmental support to a producers count as subsidies.xxxi But because 
Kurjanska and Risse end up defending something like the WTO’s policy on subsidies we might begin by 
reflecting on what the WTO says about subsidies. The WTO specifies that “there are two general types of 
subsidies: export and domestic. An export subsidy is a benefit conferred on a firm by the government that is 
contingent  on exports.  A domestic subsidy is a  benefit  not  directly linked to exports.”xxxii As we have 
already seen, Kurjanska and Risse seem to be most concerned about export subsidies because they believe 
these subsidies are more trade distorting than other kinds of domestic producer support. So, in responding 
to their arguments this section will focus primarily on showing that some export subsidies are acceptable.  
The arguments below should also apply more broadly, however.
There are a few reasons why the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject may be acceptable. First, 
Kurjanska and Risse do not provide the requisite evidence to show that because free trade “plays a crucial 
role for growth” and development, “trade-liberalization becomes mandatory for developed countries.”xxxiii 
Second, Kurjanska and Risse do not provide the requisite evidence to show that the subsides they reject are  
more trade-distorting than the subsidies they prefer. Third, even if the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject  
are more trade distorting than those they prefer, the subsidies they reject may be the most effective way to  
help poor countries develop in our non-ideal world. Let us consider each of these points in turn. We will  
then provide a further argument to show that the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject may (1) have a role 
to play in ensuring that compensation is provided to poor losers from liberalization even if (2) they are not 
backed by the best intentions. Although concern for the poor may function as a cover for subsidies that do 
not  benefit  (or  even  harm)  the  poor,  institutional  mechanisms  might  prevent  such  abuse.  This  final 
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argument may indirectly help support the claim that the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject may be the 
most effective way to help poor countries develop in our non-ideal world.  
Recall that Kurjanska and Risse start by assuming a Rawlsian liberal egalitarian framework on 
which developed countries are obligated to give priority to helping poor countries develop. xxxiv They then 
note that there is a good deal of evidence that free trade “plays a crucial role for growth as well as for other  
desirable goals of development,  such as those listed as the U.N. Millennium Goals.”xxxv Kurjanska and 
Risse cannot, however, conclude from this, as they try to do, that “trade-liberalization becomes mandatory 
for developed countries.”xxxvi Trade may lead to growth in many ways. Some ways of increasing growth 
may help poor countries and the poor within them, others do not.xxxvii Countries can grow, for instance, if 
only the rich become better off.xxxviii Similarly, although free trade probably does help some countries meet 
other important development goals, Kurjanska and Risse must show more than this. To show that free trade 
is required of developed countries, they must argue that free trade is the best way of meeting these goals;  
they must show that it is not better to allow some of the subsidies they reject. Free trade may not be the  
best way of helping poor countries develop. 
Kurjanska and Risse suggest that states should protect their citizens against the fortitudes of the  
market with production subsidies because production subsides are not trade-distorting, while most other 
subsides distort trade and result in net losses. They do not defend their claim that production subsides are  
not trade-distorting while most other subsides distort trade and result in net losses. And there is little reason 
to  believe  this.  Some argue,  for  instance,  that  many of  the  subsidies  that  are  legal  under  the  WTO, 
including those Kurjanska and Risse prefer, are trade-distorting and, more to the point, some argue that the  
subsidies Kurjanska and Risse prefer are bad for the poor. xxxix These subsidies may even be worse for the 
poor than the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject. Some of the subsides Kurjanska and Risse are objecting 
to may be no more distorting than production subsidies and, even if the subsides Kurjanska and Risse reject  
do result in a net loss, they may not only help rich workers but may be the best way to help the poor. In our  
imperfect world, the needy may gain more from distortions than they would gain from unrestricted free 
tradexl (and distortions may not make it more difficult for countries to protect their citizens against  the 
fortitudes of the market). What kinds of market reforms are best probably depends on a variety of factors. It 
may matter, for instance, how easily employers can substitute one kind of labor (e.g. high skill) for another  
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(e.g. low skill) in the production process.xli And, there is even evidence that, under some conditions, export 
subsides can be more efficient than the production subsidies Kurjanska and Risse seem to prefer.xlii 
Furthermore, even if the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject are the most trade-distorting, and 
trade-distorting subsidies are rarely one of the best ways to help poor countries develop in theory, we do 
not live in a perfect world. There may be reasons of political economy to use such subsidies rather than 
other market reforms to help these countries.xliiiIt may be easier, for instance, to get developed countries or 
corporate producers to reduce poverty through the threat of export subsidies than through taxes or other  
market reforms. There may even be some cases where the only realistic way to reduce poverty is to threaten 
to use trade-distorting subsidies to get countries to stop decimating their populations or ignoring the basic  
needs of their citizens.  Such threats may be essential in getting some countries to agree to international  
development treaties, for instance. There may also be few other ways to punish those who do not live up to 
their commitment not to harm the poor.xliv 
None of this means that allowing the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject will  more effectively 
help the poor than only allowing the subsidies  Kurjanska and Risse prefer.  It  is  entirely possible,  for 
instance, that only allowing the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse prefer may be best for the poor even if there  
are some costs to allowing those subsidies. xlv The point is just that Kurjanska and Risse have not given us 
any reason to think that it is best to only allow the subsidies they prefer.  In the absence of (extremely  
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  collect)  empirical  evidence  about  what  actually  best  fulfills  our  moral 
obligations,  liberal  egalitarians  have  no  reason  to  reject  all  export  subsidies  but  allow other  kinds  of 
producer  support.  Export  subsidies  may sometimes be  required.  Other  kinds of  producer  support  may 
sometimes be unjustifiable. Kurjanska and Risse have not made their case against the subsidies they reject.  
Liberalization may not be mandatory and (even trade-distorting) subsidies may sometimes be appropriate. 
So, it is not clearly acceptable for the WTO to generally reject export subsidies but allow other kinds of 
producer support. 
It  is  possible to put the point  in a way that  Kurjanska and Risse might  find more appealing.  
Kurjanska and Risse suggest that we need to make sure that whatever free trade occurs brings fair benefits 
to the poor. They note that the growth free trade brings may benefit some more than others and may even  
cause some problems for the poor. They suggest,  for instance,  that  we must ensure that even net food 
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importing countries  benefit  from free  trade for trade to be fair.  As Kurjanska  and Risse intimate,  one 
possibility is to use some of the gains from trade amongst WTO member countries to  compensate the 
poorest countries when they are hurt by free trade. But the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject may be the 
best way to compensate poor countries.
One way to make sure trade benefits the poor is to restructure  the rules of global trade so that they 
proactively reduce poverty. Christian Barry and Sanjay Reddy argue, for instance, that trade liberalization 
and agreements to improve labor standards and wages in developing countries should be linked.xlvi At least, 
they argue, linkage may be a good idea if it “…arises from a fair process of negotiation between states, is 
transparent  and rule-based,  is  applied in a manner that  reflects  the level  of  development of  a country, 
incorporates  adequate international  burden-sharing,  and takes  appropriate  account  of  viewpoints within 
each country.”xlvii Their arguments are cogent and compelling.xlviii Linkage may rely on the threat of trade 
policies (including the subsidies) that Kurjanska and Risse reject to get countries to stop violating labor and 
wage standards.xlix
So, one might conclude, subsidies intended to help the global poor, whatever their nature, are only 
justifiable if  they are part  of the best  development strategy.  But,  I  do not think this goes far  enough.  
Subsidies should not be prohibited just because they are intended to be protectionist. Although Kurjanska 
and Risse would probably object to this claim, what matters, primarily, is what works.l
Perhaps  Kurjanska  and  Risse  could  argue  against  ill-intentioned  subsidies,  in  particular,  as 
follows.  Kurjanska  and  Risse  might  note  that  people  may  disingenuously  cite  poverty  alleviation 
(appropriately balanced against the needs of domestic trade-displaced workers) as a reason for protectionist  
measures.  Producers  or  consumers  seeking  protection  from competition  may  take  advantage  of  well-
intentioned concern about poverty to gain economic benefits for themselves. Ethanol producers might, for 
instance, cite worries about the food security of net food importing countries as a reason for subsidizing US 
corn production.li So, Kurjanska and Risse might conclude that ill intentioned subsidies are impermissible.
This is not compelling. Some collusion between self-interested producers or consumers and those 
who genuinely care about world poverty may not be bad.  It may be possible to build coalitions of those 
who care about the global poor and those seeking protection (this is likely as the groups are not mutually  
exclusive).lii It may then be possible to adopt appropriate trade policy more quickly. If the global poor will 
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benefit appropriately from keeping corn prices low, it may be acceptable for ethanol producers to try to  
secure subsidies. The best development strategy may allow ill intentioned subsidies.
Still, it is clear that there may be a problem.  Concern for the poor may function as a cover for 
subsidies that do not benefit (or even harm) the poor. Low corn prices may not even help those who are 
currently poor in aggregate and the environmental effects of ethanol may be devastating for poor people in  
future generations. Advocates of the poor may even be fooled into supporting such harmful subsidies. 
Fortunately,  there are a few ways we might address this problem. One is through the dispute  
resolution panels of international trade agreements like the WTO. These panels may develop standards for  
judging  whether  subsidies  will  actually  reduce  poverty  appropriately  (in  light  of  the  needs  of  trade-
displaced workers). If proposed measures to benefit the poor do not benefit the poor appropriately then,  
unless there is another reason to implement such measures, they should be prohibited. liii Educating those 
who care about the poor so that they will not be fooled into supporting inappropriate trade policies may  
also help prevent such exploitation. Of course, it is risky to allow ill intentioned subsidies. But, the fact that 
such protectionism can hurt the poor does not tell against allowing even ill-intentioned subsides when they  
best promote development.
Trade-liberalization is  not  mandatory for  developed countries  even  if  it  promotes  growth  and 
development  and developed countries are obligated  to give priority to helping poor countries develop. 
Contra Kurjanska and Risse, allowing even ill-intentioned subsidies may even be the best way of ensuring 
that the poor benefit fairly from trade. 
Fair Trade
Many of the above points regarding subsidies also apply to Kurjanska and Risse’s  arguments 
against Fair Trade. So, this subsection will not reiterate them. Rather, it will raise some additional concerns 
about Kurjanska and Risse’s arguments.liv In some respects, Kurjanska and Risse’s argument against Fair 
Trade is stronger than they make out. Kurjanska and Risse suggest that it is permissible to buy Fair Trade if  
there is no reason to think it will have a large negative impact on the poor. Fair Trade is not big business.  
Sales of Fair Trade coffee, for instance, total only 87 million dollars a year which is a fraction of the world  
trade in coffee.lv So, they conclude, it is only permissible for people to purchase Fair Trade certified goods  
(from a first person perspective) because the potential harm from purchasing Fair Trade certified goods is  
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minimal and doing so benefits someone immediately. Kurjanska and Risse’s argument on this point is not  
compelling from a Rawlsian liberal egalitarian perspective, however. Although Fair Trade goods make up a 
small proportion of all traded goods, purchasing Fair Trade could hinder development and, if so, Rawlsian 
liberal egalitarians should believe it is impermissible to purchase these goods. If Fair Trade is not part of 
the best development strategy for the poor, it is unacceptable.
Kurjanska and Risse suggest that Fair Trade is not part of the best development strategy because  
people may be induced to specialize in ways that do not support their long term interests. To arrive at this  
conclusion Kurjanska and Risse do not  cite  rigorous  empirical  evidence.  Instead  they posit  a counter-
factual hypothesis about how Fair Trade would have impacted Costa Rica. But even if Costa Rica is better  
off than it would have been had it embraced Fair Trade that cannot show that Fair Trade is generally worse 
than free trade for the poor. Costa Rica may be an exception, most other countries that increase their Fair  
Trade markets may benefit. 
Furthermore, it is easy to construct a compelling theoretical argument for the conclusion that Fair 
Trade will make some poor people better off without making any of them worse off. It is even possible to 
give a theoretical argument that purchasing some Fair Trade certified goods is part of the best development 
strategy. 
Consider, first, how Fair Trade might make some poor people better off without making any of 
them worse of. In particular, consider how a consumers’ buying Fair Trade bananas (for instance) is always  
better  for  the  poor  than buying  non-Fair  Trade  bananas.  To make this  argument,  let  us  (1)  make the 
standard economic assumptionslvi and assume that (2) some of the profit from making Fair Trade rather 
than regular bananas is passed on to the poor, (3) consumers do not change the amount of bananas they  
purchase, and (4) consumers will continue to buy Fair Trade bananas into perpetuity. lvii 
Suppose a consumer will either purchase bananas from a Fair Trade source for (say) $2 a bag or 
non-Fair Trade source for $1 a bag. If the consumer buys from a Fair Trade source the poor people who 
receive her money would, without her money, either have gone out of business or not. If the poor people 
she supports would otherwise have gone out of business they would have either gone into a more profitable  
business (than the regular banana business) or not. If not, then the consumer has benefited them. If the poor  
people the consumer supports would have otherwise gone into a more profitable business (say sugar) then 
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they have done better to make Fair Trade bananas, otherwise they would have gone into sugar. lviii The poor 
people this consumer supports are, thus, better off with Fair Trade. 
The only problem arises if, after the consumer starts buying Fair Trade, she 1) stops buying Fair  
Trade or 2) buys fewer bananas total.  Suppose she buys  the same amount of bananas but only buys Fair 
Trade for a while before reverting to normal bananas. When she buys Fair Trade she creates an incentive  
for farmers to produce Fair Trade bananas. When she stops buying Fair Trade certified bananas, however, 
the Fair Trade farmer she was supporting may do worse. It depends on whether this farmer, losing business, 
reverts  to normal practices,  goes over to sugar,  or  is  unable to transition and ends up out of business 
altogether. Perhaps  in  the  interim a  better  opportunity than  sugar  has  arisen  (say,  tourism).  Everyone, 
including the farmer who grows the consumer’s Fair Trade bananas for a while, may be better off. 
Suppose  that,  instead,  the  consumer  buys  fewer  bananas.  Then  the  consumer  supports  fewer 
people. Before switching to Fair Trade, she might have spent two dollars a week on bananas and supported  
two farmers  who each make one bag a week. If  she only buys one bag of Fair Trade bananas instead 
(because, say, she only wants to spend $2 on bananas) then the Fair Trade farmer does better, but the other  
farmer may lose all income. This will not happen in all circumstances, though. Suppose, for instance, that, 
with the decline of the normal banana business, there is only room for one farmer to profit by moving into 
sugar. If the consumer starts buying Fair Trade, the poor farmer who chooses to make Fair Trade bananas 
because it is his or her best option, might otherwise have gone into sugar. But, if so, that farmer benefits – 
otherwise the farmer would make sugar instead. Furthermore, there is now room for the banana farmer who 
would otherwise have been stuck making regular  bananas to profit  by moving into sugar.  Both of the 
farmers the consumer supports before purchasing Fair Trade benefit. 
Of course, if the consumer does not buy fewer bananas, the extra money the consumer spends on 
Fair Trade bananas must come from somewhere. If the consumer stops buying papayas from an equally 
poor person she may harm some poor people while helping other poor people by buying Fair Trade. If,  
instead,  the  consumer  just  works  a  bit  harder  to  get  the  extra  money she  needs,  or  stops  purchasing 
something that only impacts rich people then the net impact of her action may be good for the poor. 
In any case, if this argument’s assumptions hold and consumers continue to buy the same amount 
of Fair Trade certified goods into perpetuity, consumers may not harm the poor and will benefit some by 
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purchasing Fair Trade.lix Fair Trade farmers will do better and some of the normal farmers may even be 
able to transition into sugar. (Though, of course, consumers might be able to help the poor more with the 
money they use to buy Fair Trade bananas). If there is no better way to help the poor, purchasing some Fair 
Trade bananas may be part of the best development strategy.
But we can go further. Purchasing some Fair Trade certified goods might even be part of the best 
development strategy (on Kurjanska and Risse’s somewhat vague Rawlsian account). Fair Trade might, for 
instance, help bring about a general  increase in production standards. If  bananas have to be Fair Trade  
certified  to  compete,  for  instance,  that  would greatly  improve many poor  peoples’  lives.  So,  even  on 
Kurjanska and Risse’s account, Fair Trade might be morally required.
Now Kurjanska and Risse would probably point out that, in reality, markets are not perfect. So,  
despite the theoretical possibility outlined above, Fair Trade may actually induce people to specialize in 
ways that do not support their long term interests. Given the transition costs, farmers who start producing  
Fair Trade goods may not be able to stop producing them and move into more profitable industries if  
demand for Fair Trade goods eventually falls or better opportunities arise.lx 
But if this is Kurjanska and Risse’s idea, then they must agree that what we really need to decide  
the issue is more empirical evidence. And, even if they would not respond in this way, it should be clear 
that such evidence is necessary. It is much too easy to come up with speculative theoretical arguments for 
and against Fair Trade. But Kurjanska and Risse do not provide any empirical evidence. So Kurjanska and 
Risse cannot conclude that Fair Trade is not part of the best development strategy for the poor. Of course,  
Kurjanska and Risse might be right that Fair Trade is not part of the best development strategy. But they 
have  not made this case.  As with subsidies,  we probably lack the information necessary to  determine  
whether  Fair  Trade is the best  development  strategy.  Without  this  information, Kurjanska  and Risse’s 
argument is much weaker than they make out. The next section will go further, however, to argue that  
giving some of the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject and purchasing some Fair Trade goods may even 
be morally required.
V. Deciding About Development in the Absence of Good Evidence
So far, this paper has suggested that Kurjanska and Risse’s arguments are not as strong as they  
make out. Their arguments do not show that trade-liberalization is mandatory. Perhaps Kurjanska and Risse 
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do not offer the requisite evidence that their preferred strategy is best because it would be very difficult, if  
not  impossible,  to figure  out what the best  development  strategy is in general.  It  is  possible to argue,  
however,  that  in  the  absence  of  empirical  evidence  making  Kurjanska  and  Risse’s  case,  it  is  morally 
acceptable to give some of the subsidies they reject (henceforth, simply, subsidies) and purchase some Fair 
Trade certified goods. For, this section will suggest that when we disaggregate the effects of subsidies and  
Fair Trade, there is reason to believe that purchasing  some Fair Trade certified goods and giving some 
subsidies can help the poor. Let us consider the case for purchasing some Fair Trade goods first because it 
requires the most argument.
Fair Trade
Recall  the claim underlying  many of  Kurjanska and Risse conclusions:  Fair  Trade  is morally  
acceptable only if it is part of the best development strategy. If it is possible to do so, we should probably 
try to figure out whether purchasing any Fair Trade certified goods is part of the best development strategy.  
But it  is very difficult if not impossible to determine what the best development strategy is in general. 
Hence, the fact that we do not know that a strategy is best is not a reason against pursing it. If, on the other  
hand, we have reason to think a strategy will help some poor people and do not have reason to think the  
strategy will harm more than help the poor, there is reason to use that strategy. Such a strategy may even be  
morally required.
Although the picture is not always rosy and Fair Trade may sometimes fail to improve incomes, 
for  instance,  there  is  evidence  that  Fair  Trade  can  bring  many benefits  to  poor  people  in  developing 
countries.lxi As one Fair Trade coffee farmer reported:
Before, life was very hard for us, mainly because we could never get a decent price for 
our coffee. Now we have our own export co-op, and we sell to the Fair Trade market.  
Fair Trade gives us a fair price and access  to credit.  It  also gives us dignity.  We are 
treated as equals.lxii  
Empirical research supports this contention. Impact assessments of Fair Trade projects suggest that they 
benefit the poor by raising prices for Fair Trade goods.lxiii In “Assessing the Potential of Fair Trade for 
Poverty Reduction and Conflict Prevention: A Case Study of Bolivian Coffee Producers” Sandra Imhof and 
Andrew Lee use quantitative and qualitative data to argue, for instance, that Fair Trade coffee producers 
make more than their competitors.lxiv Others also claim that those who participate in Fair Trade projects  
receive higher, less variable prices, credit, and training. lxv  In One Cup At A Time: Poverty Alleviation And  
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Fair Trade Coffee in Latin America Murray et. al. suggest, for instance, that participation in Fair Trade 
networks helps farmers throughout Latin America secure all of these things. lxvi The higher prices they can 
secure with Fair Trade can help the poor in many ways. They may simply help farmers make ends meet. In 
“Confronting  the  Coffee  Crisis:  Can  Fair  Trade,  Organic,  and  Specialty  Coffees  Reduce  Small-Scale 
Farmer Vulnerability in Northern Nicaragua?” Christopher Bacon argues that participating in a Fair Trade 
network helps coffee farmers in Nicaragua reduce their vulnerability to the coffee crisis. lxvii He reports that 
the Fair Trade farmers in his sample are four times less likely to lose their land than traditional farmers. lxviii 
In  "Revaluing Peasant Coffee Production: Organic and Fair Trade Markets in Mexico," Muriel Calo and 
Timothy A. Wise use theoretical  models along with survey data to argue that  Fair Trade farmers  they 
studied end up better off than those who turn to organic  production alone. lxix Other researchers suggest that 
Fair  Trade  farmers  do  better  in  part  because  they  have  more  access  to  credit,  training,  and  support 
programs.lxx 
There is even evidence that farmers participating in Fair Trade programs are better able to educate 
their childrenlxxi and meet their basic needs for things like food, water,  and housing. lxxii As another Fair 
Trade farmer put it:
The  higher  price  we  get  when  we  sell  coffee  to  Cafedirect  means  that  now  our 
cooperative  can afford to pay a doctor who will  give  treatment  to our members.  For 
myself, the price difference has meant I can afford more food for my family and send my 
children to school properly equipped with pens and notebooks for the first time.lxxiii
In short, there is evidence that Fair Trade often helps poor people in developing countries increase their  
incomes, meet their basic needs, reduce their vulnerability in times of crisis, and retain their farms.lxxiv 
Yet  other  researchers  suggest  that  there  other  benefits  of  participation  in  Fair  Trade 
organizations.lxxv As the European Fair Trade Association puts it:
[t]he producer-fair trader relationships usually go beyond just selling and buying, and can 
include  the  joint  development  of  new  products  or  product  lines,  the  adaptation  of 
products  to  European  fashions,  gaining  access  to  new  marketing  channels,  raising 
investment  or  working  capital  and  strengthening  or  expanding  the  producer 
organization.lxxvi 
As  Laura  Raynolds  reports  in  “Poverty  Alleviation  Through  Fair  Trade  Coffee  Networks:  Existing 
Research  and  Critical  Issues,”  participating  in  Fair  Trade  programs  can  help  farmers  develop  their 
organizational  capacities  within  cooperatives.lxxvii Or,  as  another  Fair  Trade  farmer  reports:  “We have 
gained a much better knowledge of the international market and of course the price is better.” lxxviii Studies 
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also suggest that Fair Trade organizations enhance the capacity of participating cooperatives to market their 
goodslxxix and have other positive effects on producers because it helps them organize. lxxx In “Coffee, Co-
operatives  and Competition:  The Impact  of  Fair  Trade,”  for  instance,  Anna Milford uses a  theoretical  
model and case study evidence to argue that the Fair Trade premium helps cooperatives maintain cohesion 
and use collective bargaining power to destabilize cartels and secure higher prices for farmers’ products. 
Milford suggests  that  these  co-operatives  not  only improve welfare  by providing education  and credit 
services but by giving farmers essential information and lobbying power.lxxxi
The  studies  of  Fair  Trade’s  impact  discussed  above  are,  of  course,  open  to  criticism.  In 
“Introduction:  Impact  Evaluation in  Official  Development  Agencies,”  Howard  White  and  Michael 
Bamberger argue, for instance, that many impact evaluations suffer from selection bias (the bias that results 
from differences between the treatment and the comparison groups). Such evaluations may fail to isolate 
the cause of Fair Trade farmers’ success.lxxxii They may fail, for instance, to consider whether those who 
participate in Fair Trade programs are generally better off than those who do not. 
Nevertheless,  Fair  Trade  impact  evaluations  are  becoming more  sophisticated  all  of  the time.  
Some of the best are quasi-experimental. lxxxiii A recent study commissioned by the Center for International 
Development Issues in the Netherlands is particularly comprehensive containing eight case studies looking 
at Fair Trade in different commodities in different places. Quasi-experimental studies help test the causal 
efficacy of Fair Trade programs to help insure a study’s internal validity. A study of a Fair Trade program’s 
efficacy has  high  internal validity when it  captures  the causal  relationships  between the particular  aid 
program being evaluated and the particular outcome observed (no matter how unique the circumstances of 
the study). Unlike experimental studies, Quasi-experimental studies do not try to insure internal validity by 
randomly assigning people (or other units of analysis) to treatment groups (e.g. those participating in a Fair 
Trade program) and comparison groups (e.g. those not participating). Instead, researchers try to minimize 
selection bias in other ways. 
An  example  will  help  illustrate  the  advantages  and  limitations  of  quasi-experimental  studies. 
Suppose we want to evaluate a Fair Trade program to see if it decreases infant mortality.  If  farmers or 
researchers decide who gets to participate, there may be a selection bias. Participants may generally be 
richer than non-participants and, so, have better access to health care and lower infant mortality rates to  
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begin with. Even if participants have lower infant mortality rates than non-participants, researchers will not  
know if the program was successful. 
Using a  quasi-experimental  method may help.  Consider  a  simple version  of  propensity  score  
matching (as the Center for International Development Issues studies used a variant of this method). With 
propensity score matching, researchers select a Fair Trade program and another cooperative or group of  
people who are as similar as possible to those in the program. Next, researchers see how people fare, on  
average, in the two groups. 
To account for differences between those in the groups that are not explained by the Fair Trade 
program researchers create “balancing scores” to try to maximize the probability that participants will be 
relevantly similar to non-participants. Researchers do propensity score matching. They look at individuals’ 
observable characteristics (e.g. land holdings, wealth, health status and gender) that might impact program 
results. On this basis, they try to figure out what each individual’s probability of participating in a Fair 
Trade  program  would  be.  The  treatment  and  comparison  groups  are  then  made  up  of  people  whose 
estimated probabilities of participating are as similar as possible.  
In the Center for International Development Issues’ study, the researchers used a Probit model to 
look  at  the  variables  influencing  participation  in  Fair  Trade  programs.  They  used  economic  theory,  
previous research, and information about the particular setting to build the model. Researchers compared 
participants’ outcomes to those expected to be most similar to them. lxxxiv Then, researchers ran regression 
analyses to see whether participation in Fair Trade organizations had a significant impact on productivity, 
access to health insurance, credit and so forth.lxxxv They found that the Fair Trade programs they studied 
generally increased participants’ food consumption and access  to credit.  On average, participants made 
more housing, land, and educational investments than those in the non-Fair Trade comparison group. lxxxvi 
Researchers  found  that  participants  were  also  more  willing  to  accept  risk  and  invest  in  the  future  – 
behaviors many argue are essential for escaping poverty. lxxxvii Notably, some of the studies even tested for 
regional affects of Fair Trade. They found general increases in market prices and wages once Fair Trade 
standards made up a significant portion of the market. 
Similarly, in “Does Consumption Help Education? The Effect of Fair Trade on Producers' Income 
and Schooling Decisions,” Leonardo Becchetti uses relatively sophisticated econometric analysis to control  
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for selection bias. He suggests that compared with non-Fair Trade farmers, Fair Trade farmers have greater  
bargaining power with intermediaries, receive higher prices, have better production systems, are happier 
with the prices  they can secure,  and have better nutrition and living conditions as well  as lower child 
mortality.lxxxviii Becchetti  also  argues  that  non-Fair  Trade  farmers  can  benefit  from nearby  Fair  Trade 
projects.lxxxix 
The  fact  that  some of  the  most  rigorous  studies  suggest  Fair  Trade’s  regional  effects  can be 
positive, provides some evidence against Kurjanska and Risse’s claim that Fair Trade will have indirect  
negative impacts on non-Fair Trade producers.xc Although Fair Trade may have negative impacts, it is not 
guaranteed  to  do  so.  Nor  have  we  discovered  any evidence  that  Fair  Trade  programs  generally  have 
negative impacts.
Although Fair Trade will not help everyone it can certainly benefit some. So, in the absence of 
evidence that Fair Trade will harm the poor more than it will help them in all cases (I know of no such 
evidence),  there  is  reason  to  purchase  some Fair  Trade  certified  goods.  Purchasing  some Fair  Trade 
certified goods (from those projects which do not harm the poor more than they help the poor) may even be  
morally  required.  This  conclusion  can  be  strengthened  if,  as  Kurjanska  and  Risse  implicitly  admit  in 
responding to the collective-preference-based argument for Fair Trade, the production processes consumers 
support  when  they  purchase  Fair  Trade  certified  goods  are  fairer  in  themselves  than  the  production 
processes consumers support when they purchase regular goods. 
Subsidies
Finally, we can provide a similar argument for giving some subsidies. We do not know which, if 
any, subsidies are part of the best development strategy. If it is possible to do so, we should probably try to  
figure out which, if any,  subsidies are part of this strategy.  In the absence of this very difficult (if not  
impossible) to collect information, however, Kurjanska and Risse should agree that developed countries 
have reason to give some subsidies. After all, Kurjanska and Risse implicitly agree that some rich country 
subsidies probably help some poor people and there is compelling evidence for this conclusion.xci As they 
note, if we liberalize trade in agricultural goods (reducing developed country export subsidies), net food  
importing countries will probably have to pay higher prices for food and, if so, will probably do worse.xcii 
Many  of  these  countries  are  poor.xciii Liberalizing  trade  in  Southern  Africa’s  staple  commodities,  for 
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instance, would probably be devastating for many countries in Southern Africa as many of these countries 
are net food importers.xciv So, some of the current (e.g.) export subsidies probably redound to the advantage 
of the poorest in these net food importing countries.xcv 
Kurjanska and Risse might  object  that  there is  a great  deal  of  evidence that  “the  aggregative 
importance of trade for development” is large.xcvi Restricting free trade by offering even some subsidies 
may hurt the poor. Subsidies may not be part of the best development strategy. 
Kurjanska  and  Risse  cannot  rest  their  case  for  subsidies  on  the  claim  that  “the  aggregative 
importance of trade for development” is large.xcvii This claim cannot show that some subsidies are not part 
of  the  best  development  strategy.xcviii To  reach  the  conclusion  that  all  subsidies  are  impermissible, 
Kurjanska and Risse would also have to defend the proposition that, everything considered, having some 
subsidies will be worse than having none at all. They do not provide this evidence. xcix Otherwise, given that 
we have evidence that some subsidies can do some good, there is reason to give some subsidies.c Giving 
some subsidies may even be morally required.ci 
IV. Conclusion
This paper has taken issue with the main philosophical argument against trade-distorting subsidies 
and Fair Trade in the literature. Contra Kurjanska and Risse, it suggested that trade-liberalization is not 
mandatory for developed countries even if it promotes growth and development and developed countries  
are  obligated  to  give  priority  to  helping  poor  countries  develop.  Giving  some  subsidies  may  be  an 
acceptable way to help the poor. Similarly,  it may be a good thing if people purchase some Fair Trade 
certified goods.  Finally,  this paper argued that  giving some  subsidies and purchasing  some  Fair  Trade 
certified goods may even be morally required. Very roughly, it suggested that it would be very difficult, if 
not impossible, to figure out what the best development strategy is, in general. So, the fact that we do not  
know that a particular development strategy is best is not a reason against pursing it. We have reason to  
think giving  some subsidies and purchasing some Fair Trade certified goods will help some poor people 
and  that  Fair  Trade  is  fairer  in  itself.cii We  do  not  have  reason  to  think  giving  some  subsidies  and 
purchasing some Fair Trade certified goods will harm the poor more than it will help the poor. So, if this 
argument goes through, there is reason to give some subsidies and purchase some Fair Trade certified  
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goods. We may even be obligated to do so. But, even if this final argument does not go through, the case 
against subsidies and Fair Trade Kurjanska and Risse present is much weaker than they make out.
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 They leave open a possible exception in cases where subsidies are necessary for a country to maintain its ability to feed its population independently.
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